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Engel v. Vitale

FLAws AND REPERcussto s or Et\CEL F .
13Y DALLIN LE\XlS

T/ITALE

1

J.

1:--:TRODl'C.TIOi'-.

n 1962, the First Amendment came under increased judicial
scrutiny as the Supreme Court examined the legality of prayer
in public schools. The Union Free School D istrict in New Il yde
Park, New York, requested that principals invite srudents to recite
a specific prayer every morning before class: ''AJmighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." This ritual
was part of a state-recommended program for the students' moral
training. While participation was voluntar)~ the parents of ten pupils
sued to stop principals from using the prayer, claiming the school
district had overstepped the boundaries of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. ln the resulting case, E11gel v.
Vitale, lower courts ruled consistently in fa,ror of the school district
until the issue reached the Supreme Court. Here, in a 6-1 decision,
the justices O\'erturned the lower courts' rulings and declared that
the Union Free School District's prayer was unconstitutional. 2
The Court, in its opinion written by Justice Hugo Black,
concluded that dus prayer "was composed by governmental officials
as a part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs"3
and that such actions were impermissible under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The Court's opinion asserts that the
First Amendment "must at least mean that in this country it is no
part of the business of government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American peopJe to recite as a part of a religious
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program carried on by the government." 1 To justify this interpretation,
the Court leaned heavily on historical evidence to understand
the Founder's original intent in composing the Uill of Rights.
However, an im·estigation of the writings of men like James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson-as well as an analysis of the actual
text of the Constitution-shows that the Court faik:cl to consider
substantial evidence that undermined its interpretation of the Founders'
original intent. Likewise, the Court overlooked contemporary churchstare precedent that suggested gm·ernment and religion were nor
mutually exclusive, and it also failed to recognize that certain religious
practices that had preYiously been deemed acceptable were at that time
taking place within the federal government. Unfortunately, the Court's
flawed ruling in E'~e/bas become a faulty basis for later decisions that
have deviated even further from the First Amendment's original intent.
To remedy tills situation, the Supreme Court needs to reevaluate the
Founders' position on church-state issues, recognize the gap between the
Pounders'positionandirsownimerpreration,andovenurnE1~e/v. Vitale.

II.

0RIG~ALTSM

In explaining irs decision in Engel, the Supreme Court draws
heavily from historical sources rather tban relying on legal precedent.
ln fact, the Court's opinion cites only one other Supreme Court case
directly, which it uses solely to establish the court's reason for granting
certiorari. 5 I nstead, Justice Black focuses primarily on the Founding
period's religious hisrory and the words of one of the Constitution's
key framers, James Madison. Black also says that the Court agrees with
the petitioners that the Union Free School District's prayer breached
the "wall of separation between church and state,"6 a phrase first used
by Thomas Jeffcrson. 7 This approach, interpreting the Constitution
by looking to the initial intent of its framers, is called "originalisrn."
4
5
6
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According tO Professor Rodney K. Smith, "those who hold to the ...
originalist viewpoint maintain that in exercising juclicial review; judges
must refer to the text of the Constitution and to the intent of the
framers and ratifiers of the pro,·ision or provisioners at issue on a given
case."ll In other words, when using originatism, the Supreme Court looks
directly at the Founders' intent, not precedent. lf the Court wishes to
take an originalist approach on a case, it must provide solid, compelEng
evidence that its ruling is exactly how the Founders would have
interpreted the same case. An investigation of 1\Iadison's and Jefferson's
own writings and actions, however, reveals a substantial amount
of evidence that undermines the Court's original.ist interpretation.

Ill. HISTORICAL ANALYsrs OF Tw'o Fou DL'IG FATrmRs' PoslTro:-.~s
In defending the Court's ruling, Justice Black relies heavily on
the words of James Madison. Black rebuts any notion that the Regents'
prayer is too brief tO be considered "a danger to religious freedom" by
quoting Maclison's J.Hemotial and Remonstrance against Religious AssesstJJmt.

[I] tis proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties.... \Vho does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That
thesameauthorit:ywh.ich can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of
any one establishment, may force him to conform
to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever? 9
This excerpt of 1\[adison's serves as Justice Black's
main defense as to why a prayer that is both short and nondenominational is nonetheless unconstitutional. The slightest
8
9

K. S\rrrH, PuBLIC PR.m::.R AND 111E Co;.;s-nn'Tto~ 2 (1987).
Engel\', Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,436 (1962).

Rool-. tY

55

BYU Prelaw Review, Volume 21, 2007

"experiment" on religious liberties, the quote suggests, can lead
down a dangerously slippery slope towards an established church.
However, an inYestigation into the intent of the Constitutional
Framers must also consider the events and time period in ·which they
lived. To judge their words by conremporary situations alone can
lead to misinterpretations because of differences in situations and
definitions between then and now. Understanding historical context
is particularly important in church-state issues because the religious
landscape is much different today than it was in the 18"' century
Trying to understand the context in which James J\ladison lived and
wrote sheds g reater light on his comments on church-state issues.
James Madison lived in a time when it was a real possibility that
a denomination would become the established religion of the land.
He saw certain individuals call for establishing the Anglican Church
as the official church of Virginia. w He watched a Baptist preacher in
Culpeper, Virginia discourse to his congregation behind jail cell bars. 11
He understood that unless religious freedom was assured in the new
country, a majority religion, like the Anglican Church, might gain control
and establish itself above all other denominations, in which case "slavery
and subjection might and would have been gradually insinuated among
[all Americans]." 12 Theseinstances of harsh religious intolerance sharply
contrast with the prayer at issue in Engelt\ ~ 7ita/e, a prayer completely
voluntary and devoid of any reference to Christianity or any other
specific religion. America during Madison's era was not concerned
with whether government could promote religion in general, but with
whether government could promote one religion as superior to another.
Madison's actions as a politician also contradict Black's
notion that Madison sought a strict division between d1e secular and
religious parts of society. For instance, Madison was a member on
d1e congressional committee that recommended the appointment

10
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of the first congressionaJ chaplain. 13 Madison, during his Presidency,
declared several national days of prayer and fasting, proclaiming that
[a day] be set apart for the devout purposes of
rendering the sovereign of the Universe ... the public
homage due to His holy attributes and especially
offering fervent supplications ... that He would inspire
all nations with a love of justice ... with a reverence for
the unerring precept of our holy religion ro do others
as they would require that others should do to them. 1 ~
H ere is another example of Madison emphasizing the
importance of God in American society. Dedicating a day to pay
"public homage" to a Supreme Being promotes religion without
advancing one religion over another. This was, essentiaJly, what the
Union Free School District :tttempted to do with its prayer. The
assertion that Madison would disapprove of the school district's
practice seems to conflict with his calls for national days of prayer.
Madison would certainly not set aside a national day for citizens
to voluntarily gather together in prayer and then deny school
children the option to voluntarily p~rticipate in a school prayer.
Additionally, when Madison bad the opportunity to push
for greater separation of church and state, he refrained from doing
so. As an elected delegate for the Revolutionary Convention, he
was directly involved in the drafting and refining of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights.15 One such right was the freedom of worship,
which G eorge Mason originally proposed in the following manner:
That as Religion . .. can be governed only by Reason and
Conviction, not by Force or Violence; and therefore
that all Men shou'd enjoy the fullest Toleration in the
I3
(1985).
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L~xercis e of Religion ... unpunished and unrestrained

by

the l\lagistrate, unless ... any Man clisturb the Peace ...
It is the mutual Dutv of all, to practice Christian
l·orbearance, Lm e and Charity towards each othcr. 111
\\:'hen the phrase "Christian Forbearance, Love and Charity" was
omitted in one draft, .l\laclison reinserted it in a later one. 1" llad
.t\ladison truJr sought to totally divorce the secular from the religious,
as the Supreme Court claims he clid, he would certainly not ha' e
reinstated the language concerning a citizen's duty to practice
certain Christian \'irtues. Maclison was concerned about a particular
denomination becoming established is the official church of the
land, not with whether government promoted religion in general.
But the Founders' intent cannot be deduced based on just one
man's writings and actions. To learn more about rhe Framer's intent,
anOLher famous Pounder should be considered: Thomas Jefferson,
who is quoted in a number of religion and state cases, including
lvy11olds 1: U11ited States, Everson t! Board of Education, and McCollum
I! Bomrl of Ed11rtrtio11. Though Justice Black does nor specifically
cite Jefferson, be docs reference Jefferson's oft-quoted phrase, "a
wall of separation between church and srate" 111 when explains the
Court's decision for overturning the previous ruling. Because Black
uses Jefferson's "wall" phrase in his opinion co support the court's
decision, Jefferson's ,-ie\\· on the church-state issues, which has long
been defined by dte "wall" phrase, thus needs to be addressed.
i\lany conclude that Jefferson's "wall" quote prm·es that
.Jefferson advocated a strict division between church and state.Jefferson's
actions and other writings, howeYer, show that he Sa\\ a strong need
for religious and moral education in public schools. Jefferson explained
his view of education in the following words: "Can the liberties of
a nation be thought secure when we have remm·ed their only firm
basis-a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberucs
16

17
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are .. .the gift of God?" 1 ~ ln a letter to another Founder, John Adams,
Jefferson remarked that religion "is more than an inner conviction of
the existence of the Creator; true religion is morality." 20 Jefferson also
believed that one of the key aims of religious education was "to make
men moral."21 Jefferson recognized that morality was imperative for
maintaining a liberal society and that morality stemmed from religious
education. Because Jefferson considered religion to play an important
part in moral education, he would ha,-e approved of initiati,·es like
the school clistrict's prayer that promote religion in education . Also,
during his presidency, Jefferson signed a treaty with the Kaskakia
Indians in which he gave monetary support to the Roman Catholic
church and the priest who was presiding within that tribe. 22 Once
again, Jefferson demonstrated that he did not envision a complete and
total separation between government and religion. Instead, he belieYed
that religion could be useful in promoting morality among America's
citizens, which is what the Regents' prayer was designed to do.

IV

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

An analysis of the textual history of the First Amendment
itself reveals that the Pounders' original intent was to ensure
that there was never a government denomination, not that the
government could not promote religion generally. The First
Amendment, as it is known today, reads: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." 1\ilichael Malbin, a professor of Political Science
at State University of New York, says this about the amendment:
Had d1e Framers prohibited 'th e establishment of
religion,' which would ha,·e emphasized dte generic
word 'religion,' there might have been some reason
19
20
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for thinking they wanted to prohibit aJl official
preferences of religion over irreligion. But by choosing
'an csrablishmem' over 'the establishment,' they were
sho\\ ing that therwamed to prohibit only those official
actl' iues that tended to promote the interests of one
or another particular sect. Thus, through the choice
of 'an' O\'cr 'the,' conferees indicated their inrem. 23
In defining tl1e Bill of llights, the Continental Congress went
through multiple drafts of the first Amendment. \X'hile each included
the notion of religious freedom, the exact wording was written ami
rewritten time and time again. 24 One such draft said that "Congress
shall make no Ia\\' establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise
thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience," while another declared
"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion." b·idently,
the final language of the Establishment Clause was not accidental,
but a meticulous choice that followed much deliberation. Thus, as
Malbin's analysis shows, if the Founders indeed sought to create a
complete di\'ision between church and state, one that would prohibit
the recitation of non-denominational prayers, the First Amendment's
language would have denounced the establishment of "religion," not
"a religion," as it does today. This distinction reemphasizes that the
Founders were nm concerned about encouraging religion generally,
but rather feared that a particular religion or denomination would
become dominant m·er others. A non-denominational prayer certainly
does promote religion generally, but promoting religion does not run
contrary in and of itself to the currentwordingof the First Amendment.

23
~h< 11 \W J. ,\l\1.81,, RrUGio' .>u-.:n PoLrnu.,
Au 11-t<~RS ot• 1111 l'tR:;T A~t F.NDt\ I F-.Nl 1-1- 15 (1978).
24
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V. j UDIClAL VIEW'S OF TilE TIME
At the time when Engel ~~ Vitale was decided, precedent on
church-state issues, while new and inconclusive, did not provide
significant support for Justice Black's decision. Around the time of
Engel, the Supreme Court had just barely begun to rule on state cases
invohring the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Thus, there
were no clear precedents before the Supreme Court on the legality
of school prayer.25 Nonetheless, previous rulings in state Supreme
Courts concerning prayer in public schools did not support the
Court's decision in EngeL Prof. Chester James Antieau and others
at Georgetown University note that a significant number of state
Supreme Courts, like those in Colorado, Florida, Texas, Ohio, New York,
and 10 others, had ruled prior to Engel that Bible-reading or in-school
prayer at public schools was permissible. On the other hand, only a
few-Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, and \'\'isconsin- had declared that
school prayer or Bible-reading was unacceptable. 26 Additionally, some
of the Supreme Court's own decisions towards the First Amendment
and the Establishment Clause around this time asserted that religion
does have a place in the public sector. ''\"\'e are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Be.ing," Justice Douglas wrote in
Zorach tt Cla11son, which permitted public schools to offer a release-time
program to their students so they could attend religious instruction
and services off-campus.27 \X'hile some decisions did indeed support
a stricter separation uf church and state at the state and federal level,
there was certainly enough juxisprudence contrary to the Court's ruling
in Engel to question the strength of the Black's opinion. This may well
have been why the Court cited no other Supreme Court cases in its

25

S~UTH,

26
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opinion, except ro defend its decision to grant certiorari. Either way,
t.he Court did not have clear precedent for its decision in Engel n Vitale.

VI.

REuG1ous PRACTICES 1~ G oVER.'\l~lE:-rr

One of Engel's implications is that the government cannot
sponsor any type of prayer in its public buildings or during governmentled events. Nonetheless, this implication stands in conflict with current
federal government practices. Prayer is a mainstay in government
meetings and has been for many years. For instance, the Supreme
Court begins each one of its sessions with the Court Crier exclaiming:
"God save the United States and this Honorable Court."28 This is a
plea for protection to a deistic figure and is very similar to the Regents'
prayer, which acknowledges God and pleads for blessings from his
hand. Likewise, the United States Congress begins each of its sessions
with a paid chaplain giving a commencement prayer.29 Thus, on the
one hand, federal public servants offer a prayer to begin their meetings,
but on the other, students in public schools cannot join in a public
prayer to begin their day. This double standard sends an inconsistent
and confusing message about government-sponsored prayer. It is
unfair to limit public school students' First Amendment rights while
congressmen and Supreme Court justices freely enjoy those same rights.

VIl. MlSLEt\DING

PRECEDENT

Unfortunately, not only did the Court misinterpret the Framers'
intent of drafting the First Amendment in Engel v. Vitale, it also
established a precedent that has misled the judicial system in later churchstatecases. Engel's stanceon church-stateissues has become tbefoundation
upon which the Supreme Court has decided many church-state cases.
This stance has, over time, slowly become ever more slanted towards a
strict, uncompromising separation between government and religion.
28
Engel v. Vitale, 370 C. S. 421 (1962), (Douglas,]., concurring).
29
Chaplin o f the I louse of Hcpresentatives, http:/ I chaplain.housc.gov/
histinfo.html (last \'i~ited Mar. 6, 2007).
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In ~Wallace t: Jaffree, d1e Supreme Court, relying on En,P,el as
precedent, struck down an Alabama statute that prescribed a oneminute moment of silence in schools for meditation and voluntary
prayer.30 I n Engel, the Supreme Court found fault with government
prescribed prayer, stating that the Establi shment Clause must" ... at least
mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government
to compose official prayers for any group of the American people
to recite..." 31 HoweYer, under the Alabama statue, the goYernment
clid not compose any specific prayers for students to recite; rather,
it is merely allocated time to do so if students wish. In li/al/ace, the
Court said that Engel "prohibits a State from authorizing prayer in
public schools." 32 lt also cited Engrl directly as saying that "The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or
not.'>33 But setting aside a o ne-minute period for students to pray on
their own accor<.l neither authorizes a prayer nor establishes an official
religion. Since the time period is free for students to pray or not pray
as they wish, the government in no way establishes an official religion
or "lcomposesl official prayers."34 In IPallace} then, while using Engel as
precedent, the Court strayed even further from Engels original holding.
Likewise, in Lee v. Ul'eisman, which also cited Engel as a
precedent, the Supreme Court barred a prayer that was not composed
by government officials. In this case, the Court ruled that allowing
principals to invite clergyman to give graduation commencement
prayers is unconstitutionaJ.35 In its opinion, the Court looked to Justice
Black's words in Engel that "it is no part of the business of government
to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
30
31
?2
33

34
35
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Engel v. Virale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
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recite as a part of a religious program carried on by gm·ernment."36 Yet
the government does not compose prayers when it invites a man of faith
co speak at a school celebracion.ln fact, this situation is almost identical
to having a chaplain open a congressional session with a prayer. In both
cases, a prayer-one not officially composed by the government-is
offered freely at a government event by a person of faith. The prayer
given is not the established creed of the gO\·ernment, but instead the
prarer of a clergyman. If there is no implication that the congressional
chaplain by offering a prayer at the start of each session of Congress is
establishjng a religion, then no such implication should be inferred when
a clergyman offers a prayer at a high school graduation. In Lee, as well as
in lf7allace, the Supreme Court misconstrued Engelto set an overly strict
definition for improper legal involvement between church and state.

VIIL

CONCLUSION

In its ruling in Engel n Vitale, the Supreme Court banned
school prayer on the basis of the Court's interpretation of the
Framers' original intent in drafting the Constitution. Yet, strong
evidence that the Founders would have ruled differently on this issue
undermines the Court's decision. Since this ruling, however, the new
precedent Engel created has been further misconstrued as the Court
has deviated furth er and further not only from the Founders' original
intent, but from Engel itself Supreme Court cases citing Engel have
moved towards an increasingly stringent division between religion
and government, as shown in Tr4/lace t: Jaffree and Lee v. lfl'eisman.
Before the Court wanders even fartl1er from the original
intent of the First Amt!ndment, it needs to revise and overturn its
ruling in Engel. Since Engel has established precedent based on false
presumptions, it is not enough for the Supreme Court to try and realign
its rulings \\ith the Founders' intent by looking to recent cases.lnstead,
the Court needs to return to its originalist approach in Engel, this time
focusing on what the Framer's true intentwasin declaringthat"Congress
36

l:flgel, 370 U.S., a.r cited i11 id.
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shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.".r Indeed, the conclusion should be clear:
America's Framers did not intend for a complete and total separation of
church and state, as seems to be the prevailing norm in today's society.
James Madison and others worried that a single denomination would
become the established religion of the U.S. goyernment. Their intention
in the Establishment Clause was to prevent any one denomination
from becoming the official state religion, not prohibit public schools
from leading ten-second prayers. The Supreme Court thus needs to
carefully re-examine the First Amendment, paying particularly close
attention to the final clause: "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

37

L'.S. Co"'ST. amend. 1.
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